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Sudan’s Counterrevolutionary War: The Systematic Targeting of Pro-Democracy Activists
- Hamid Khalafallah, The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
- Apr 14
- 6 min read
Updated: 4 days ago
The war in Sudan is not only a power struggle between military factions, but also an attempt at silencing those who dare envision a different future for Sudan—one rooted in democracy and justice.
Two years into the devastating war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), SAF regained control of Khartoum, the capital city where the fighting began in April 2023. SAF’s victory in Khartoum carries significant symbolic and strategic implications, given its status as the epicenter of the power struggle between SAF and RSF.
This war, however, has proven to be more than a power struggle between SAF and RSF, as the events of the past two years have revealed. The concerning pattern of relentless and systematic attacks on civilian groups, particularly pro-democracy actors, by both SAF and RSF has shown that both warring factions share a vested interest in suppressing Sudan’s democratic movement. The recent events in Khartoum serve as a microcosm of this broader conflict.
The Khartoum paradox: Liberation and repression
As SAF consolidated control over Khartoum at the end of March 2025, two years after the war started, a familiar paradox unfolded. On one hand, Sudanese citizens in Khartoum and beyond celebrated this victory, relieved to end two years of terror and suffering under RSF control. On the other hand, pro-democracy activists and grassroots organizers found themselves under renewed attacks, this time from SAF-aligned militias. This duality of liberation and repression is not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a broader pattern observed throughout Sudan during the conflict. Whenever one warring faction gains control of an area, it allows opponent troops to withdraw peacefully, only to unleash retaliatory violence against civilians. While the motives behind these attacks may differ, civilians have consistently borne the brunt of violence from both SAF and RSF. Notably, the attacks on civilians have mostly focused on pro-democracy activists, particularly members of the Resistance Committees and the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs).
"Whenever one warring faction gains control of an area, it allows opponent troops to withdraw peacefully, only to unleash retaliatory violence against civilians"
The Resistance Committees are Sudan’s prominent pro-democracy grassroots movement. They spearheaded the revolution which toppled Omar al-Bashir’s authoritarian regime in 2019 and continued to play key roles. They were also pivotal in resisting the military coup that was jointly orchestrated by SAF and RSF in 2021. Over time, they grew to become influential actors in Sudan’s political sphere, embodying democratic ideals through their decentralized structure and community-based activism. When the war erupted in 2023, Resistance Committees shifted their focus toward humanitarian efforts by establishing the ERRs. These grassroots initiatives, which were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize last year, have been providing food, water, emergency medical care, and have organized evacuations for thousands of families trapped in conflict zones. In addition to their humanitarian focus, Resistance Committees—and by extension ERRs—remain deeply committed to the belief that sustainable peace in Sudan cannot be achieved without pursuing democratic governance
The systematic targeting of pro-democracy activists
Throughout the conflict, pro-democracy activists were targeted in different ways. The RSF’s attacks are more indiscriminate and affect broader populations, and the militia employs widespread terror tactics to suppress any form of resistance. The RSF has, evidently, killed, injured, and unlawfully detained scores of civilians and raped women and girls during attacks across the country. In West Darfur, they have committed a documented genocide. They also perceive pro-democracy activists—particularly members of Resistance Committees and ERRs—as posing a direct threat to their ability to govern areas under their control. As such, there have been numerous documented instances of RSF detaining activists and keeping them in secret centers where they were subjected to brutal torture and executions.
"The systematic and persistent targeting of pro-democracy actors is a defining feature of Sudan’s war, exposing its deeper nature as a counterrevolution against Sudan’s democratic aspirations."
On the other hand, SAF and its allied militias have also repeatedly targeted pro-democracy activists, but under vague accusations of being RSF “collaborators,” framing the targeting as part of counterinsurgency efforts. In areas SAF recaptures, lists of alleged RSF collaborators—often dominated by names of pro-democracy activists—circulate widely through SAF-aligned media, serving as justification for summary executions and extrajudicial killings. In reality, these actions are part of a broader campaign to eliminate pro-democracy actors. The narrative of collaboration is weaponized not only to justify these killings but also to mobilize public support for such atrocities. The pattern was documented in the states of Gezira, Sinnar, Khartoum, and other areas.
The systematic and persistent targeting of pro-democracy actors is a defining feature of Sudan’s war, exposing its deeper nature as a counterrevolution against Sudan’s democratic aspirations. This counterrevolutionary war aims to dismantle Sudan’s democratic movement, crack down on civic spaces, and eliminate civilian-led governance. While they may differ in tactics and motivations, both the SAF and RSF share an interest in suppressing pro-democracy actors and movements that challenge their authority. This counterrevolutionary agenda explains why civilians are consistently targeted whenever frontlines shift. As fighting subsides between the SAF and RSF in an area, attacks against civilians spike either as punishment for alleged collaborators or elimination of potential opposition.
Islamist vengeance: A driving force behind repression
The Islamists—loyalists of Bashir’s regime—are among the most ardent inciters and supporters of this counterrevolutionary agenda. Islamist leaders have openly declared their intent to punish pro-democracy activists for their role in ousting Bashir’s regime during the 2019 revolution. Their plan to restore military authoritarian rule under Islamist control is no secret. To them, the war is not just about defeating the RSF but also about eradicating any remnants of Sudan’s revolutionary movement. The influence of the Islamists is most noticeable through their alliance with SAF. This partnership has emboldened SAF to reintroduce tools of oppression reminiscent of Bashir’s regime. A key player in these attacks is Al-Bara’ Ibn Malik Brigade—a SAF-aligned Islamist militia responsible for leading many assaults on pro-democracy actors.
The alliance between SAF and the Islamists debunks claims suggesting that SAF can be perceived as a pro-democracy ally. While some pro-democracy activists have aligned with SAF to counter the existential threat posed by the RSF, this alignment is arguably tactical and temporary in many cases. It may not necessarily reflect ideological support for SAF or its Islamist backers. Many of those pro-democracy activists who are currently siding with SAF have made it clear that once the war ends, they will resume their pro-democracy role—a stance that will likely expose them to further targeting by both SAF and Islamist factions.
The illusion of military victory
SAF’s victory in Khartoum marks a significant turning point but does not signal an end to the war. Fighting outside Khartoum continues to intensify as RSF retaliates with renewed attacks in other parts of the country. Inside Khartoum itself, civilians—particularly pro-democracy activists—remain at great risk due to reprisals by SAF-aligned militias. The humanitarian situation is also deteriorating rapidly: many ERR volunteers have fled due to reprisal attacks, leaving vulnerable communities without essential services. In one area in Southern Khartoum, as many as 80 percent of the volunteers have fled the area.
Given the counterrevolutionary nature of this war, a military victory cannot guarantee peace; it would only entrench autocratic rule at an unimaginable cost to human life and freedom. Therefore, there will be no military solutions to this war, and pursuing peace processes is still a paramount priority. Such efforts must center pro-democracy civilian actors rather than legitimize warlords or military leaders. It should also address the counterrevolutionary aspects of the war, by ensuring that the democratic agenda is properly included and that pro-democracy actors, in particular the grassroots groups, are meaningfully engaged.
Defending Sudan’s democratic future
The two-year war in Sudan continues to prove that, at its core, it is fundamentally a counterrevolutionary campaign aimed at eradicating the country’s democratic aspirations.
The recent events in Khartoum are a stark reminder that neither of the warring factions prioritizes civilian protection or democratic governance. It reconfirms that their mutual goal is to crush Sudan’s democratic movement once and for all. Therefore, any military victory will only entrench authoritarian rule, ultimately, annihilating the legacy of Sudan’s revolution and its advocates. To that end, the war’s true toll should not be measured just in territorial gains, but in the suffocation of Sudan’s democratic future.
Only a political solution that centers civilians can end this war while protecting Sudan’s democratic future. Pro-democracy activists are bearing the brunt of this war; they have shown remarkable resilience in providing humanitarian assistance amid grave dangers, while also being a prime target for both SAF and RSF. Yet, they must not be viewed merely as casualties but as indispensable architects of any viable post-war governance structure.
Hamid Khalafallah is a former Nonresident Fellow at TIMEP focusing on inclusive governance and mobilization in Sudan. He is a development practitioner, researcher, and policy analyst.
(c) 2025, The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.
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