Sudanese are losing hope with each new peace initiative

The array of peace processes has allowed the warring parties to forum-shop while the humanitarian crisis intensifies.

After Sudan’s third civil war erupted in April 2023, concerns were expressed about the risks of a proliferation of peace processes, given the country’s geostrategic location. Straddling North, Central and the Horn of Africa with 650 km of Red Sea coastline, and endowed with natural resources, Sudan is the gateway to the Sahel for state and non-state actors alike.

Peace efforts have indeed mushroomed as divergent interests create competition among peace brokers. Various mediation processes are underway at country, regional and continental levels.

Several multilateral organisations of which Sudan is a member, have a responsibility to intervene if required. These include the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Community of Sahel-Saharan States, Eastern Africa Standby Force, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), League of Arab States, African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN).

All these stakeholders, plus some of Sudan’s neighbouring countries, have tried to bring the warring parties – the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – to the negotiating table. But is this multiplicity of initiatives helping or hurting Sudan? On the ground, the situation is encouraging the antagonists to forum-shop and buy time while the humanitarian crisis plunges Sudanese into the abyss.

The Ceasefire Talks, co-hosted by Saudi Arabia and Switzerland in Geneva, are the most recent initiative – set to start on 14 August. Building on the Jeddah Process, the conveners have invited RSF and SAF representatives to attend, with the UN, AU, Egypt and United Arab Emirates (UAE) as observers.

Apart from the United States passing the facilitation role to Switzerland, it is unclear how this process differs from or enhances the Jeddah Process. The facilitators’ ambivalence around observer selection and the exclusion of some pivotal member states could add to the problem. The SAF’s requirement for participating in the Geneva talks – that the RSF comprehensively withdraw and cease expansion – further diminishes prospects for success.

Despite being observers at the Geneva talks, the AU, Egypt and UAE all have their own parallel processes. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) tasked the AU Commission with creating the High-Level Panel on Sudan. Since its formation in February, the panel met with the warring parties’ leaders and initiated the intra-Sudanese dialogue. It seems to be the only initiative that has talked to both sides on their own turf while simultaneously engaging Sudanese civil society and political actors.

Although the panel was making progress, in June the PSC directed the AU Commission Chairperson to establish an Ad Hoc Presidential Committee. Comprising one head of state from each of the AU’s five regions, the committee will facilitate face-to-face meetings between the SAF and RSF.

A third AU effort – the Expanded Mechanism created in May 2023 – convenes all diplomatic stakeholders during open and closed PSC sessions on Sudan. Despite having no clear role or mandate, the mechanism continues to be referenced in PSC communiqués as a key instrument driving the AU’s agenda on Sudan.

To avoid a duplication of effort and resources, the AU should recognise the limitations of the Expanded Mechanism. And if the High-Level Panel on Sudan has a technical mandate, with the ad hoc committee taking care of political matters, the AU should communicate that along with each structure’s terms of reference.

In June, the PSC cautioned against the proliferation of peace processes and urged all stakeholders to work in an inclusive, coordinated way. However, the AU has created three mechanisms in one year and is also an observer to the talks in Jeddah and Geneva.

The AU should use its position to integrate and harmonise peace efforts. This is particularly important at the regional level, where some regional economic communities, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and Community of Sahel-Saharan States, plan to add to the traffic jam of peace initiatives. And the bilateral initiatives led by Egypt and Ethiopia don’t fall under the umbrella of a regional organisation or the AU.

Besides the lack of coordination and strategic guidance among the different initiatives, the biggest problem is the warring parties’ military positions. Mediation efforts should be well timed and reflect realities on the ground.

The humanitarian implications are dire – with nearly 10 million people internally displaced and over 25 million facing acute hunger. Egregious war crimes have occurred, and sexual and gender-based violence is commonplace. Both parties have been accused of blocking humanitarian access while battling to hold their military advantage in cities across Sudan.

The proliferation of peace processes has allowed the parties to forum-shop and undermine any leverage the mediators may have had. The SAF and RSF can cherry-pick initiatives without committing to any implementable accord or declaration. To date, only the Jeddah Declaration has resulted in short-term ceasefires.

Although some peace brokers have voiced their different responsibilities and comparative advantages, their mandates are the same, and it’s unclear whether they can deliver technical, political or financial leverage. A single, coordinated process is needed that includes deadlines and reflects the military footprint of the RSF and SAF.

The AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Crisis in Sudan, created before the ad hoc committee and high-level panel, should be revised and updated to mandate the various initiatives with a clear division of labour under a single African umbrella.

The people of Sudan are losing hope with every additional process. The AU roadmap steered by the high-level panel should be the blueprint to which the continental and regional processes align.

https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sudanese-are-losing-hope-with-each-new-peace-initiative